The perils of intelligence agencies recruiting jihadist sources

Knowing one’s enemy—getting that crucial human intelligence—involves extraordinary risks when your enemy is a nation-state. When it’s a non-state, transnational terrorist network that compartmentalizes everything and hides in the shadows, and whose own stated mission is relentless violence and the overthrow of governments in the service of fanatical religious identity, the ordinary risks and obstacles to penetrating your target become far more difficult—and dangerous.

From Chapter 4 of the 9/11 Commission Report:

Quote:

In fall 1999, DCI Tenet unveiled the CIA’s new Bin Ladin strategy. It was called, simply, “the Plan.” The Plan proposed continuing disruption and rendi*tion operations worldwide. It announced a program for hiring and training bet*ter officers with counterterrorism skills, recruiting more assets, and trying to penetrate al Qaeda’s ranks.

https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/911comm-sec4.pdf

Now, some examples of US recruitment of jihadist sources gone horribly wrong:

Quote:

He came to the United States working as a translator for Ayman al-Zawahiri who toured California in 1993 following the World Trade Centre bombing, hoping to raise money for al-Jihad from the numerous Islamic charities that still existed from the days of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. While there, Zawahiri encouraged him to infiltrate the United States, claiming to be defecting to the United States. When he simply walked into the CIA office in Cairo and asked to speak to the station chief to offer his services, the Americans assumed he was an Egyptian spy, but nevertheless recruited him to be a junior intelligence officer. When tasked to infiltrate a mosque with ties to Hezbollah, he instead informed the imam he was an American spy intending to collect information. Another loyal American spy was also in the congregation and he reported Mohamed to the CIA, which dismissed him and sought to ban him from entering the United States. However, he later enlisted in the U.S. Army Special Forces, who sent him to the Special Warfare school and encouraged him to pursue a doctorate in Islamic Studies to teach courses on the Middle East.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Mo...t)?wprov=sfti1

Quote:

While the DEA seemingly made great gains from Gilani's intelligence, there is ample evidence that Gilani abused his status as an informant.He allegedly tried to set up heroin dealers with jailhouse phone calls that were not monitored by DEA agents. A mentally impaired Pakistani immigrant, Ikram Haq, was found to have been tricked into making a drug deal by Gilani, and was subsequently acquitted on the grounds of entrapment when brought to trial. Despite this result, Gilani was released from prison and put on probation for his contribution to the case. One anonymous former associate of Gilani later suggested that he was exploiting his rapport with the DEA, saying, ”The DEA agents liked him. He would brag about it. He was manipulating them. He said he had them in his pocket."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Headley?wprov=sfti1

Quote:

According to intelligence officials, al-Balawi had been invited to FOB Chapman after claiming to have information related to senior al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. He was not closely searched because of his perceived value as someone who could infiltrate the ranks of senior al-Qaeda leaders. The CIA had come to trust the informant, and the Jordanian spy agency vouched for him, according to officials.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Humam_...wi?wprov=sfti1

All of this makes me wonder about the CIA’s failure to pass on the information about Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Midhar to the FBI, and the assistance they were given by a Saudi intelligence officer (Omar al-Bayoumi) as well as a few other Saudi officials in the US who were connected to the Saudi embassy and consulates. To this day, some former FBI agents (and Richard Clarke) think something was going on between the CIA and Saudi intelligence re: Hazmi and Midhar, but all of their evidence is circumstantial and inferred speculation at best.

Still, as demonstrated by the examples above, the US government HAS tried to recruit/“flip” al-Qaeda operatives both before and after 9/11—and as demonstrated above, it’s often been a deadly disaster.

via International Skeptics Forum https://ift.tt/IbxnF7V