There is an argument in moral philosophy, that sets out a scenario that I am out walking in an expensive pair of shoes and I see a child drowning, but in order to save him I will ruin my expensive shoes. The argument goes that I would not hesitate to sacrifice those shoes in order to save the child, so I am being inconsistent if I would not forgo buying the shoes in the first place in order to send the money overseas to save the life of a child.
My first reaction to this is "Hey, he's right, next time I see a child drowning and I am wearing an expensive pair of shoes then I should just let the child drown, because I wouldn't sacrifice the shoes to save a child overseas so if I save this child I am being inconsistent and being inconsistent is wrong".
Yes, I know the philosophers in question have in mind that I fix the inconsistency problem by forgoing the shoes and sending the money overseas to save a child there.
But my way fixes the inconsistency problem just as well and also gets me the shoes.
And, yes, I am being facetious. The problem is not inconsistency. The problem is children (or anyone) dying when they could be saved.
But is it even inconsistent in the first place?
I would sacrifice the shoes to save the drowning child because a child dying right in front of me would make me feel absolutely terrible and I would feel terrible not saving him.
But, in common with pretty much every other human being, children dying far away has a lot less emotional impact on me. That is just they way we are built.
So I am being perfectly consistent if I would sacrifice the shoes to save the child in front of my eyes but not the child overseas, because the reason I make the sacrifice is the emotional impact and I am proportioning the sacrifice I would make to that emotional impact of the death on me.
In fact I would be inconsistent if I were to make a greater sacrifice proportional to the emotional impact for the child overseas.
And, again, if inconsistency is the problem we are trying to address (rather than children dying needlessly) then I should continue to consistently apportion my sacrifice to the emotional impact of the death on me.
I guess the philosophers in question might say that I ought to feel as strongly about deaths far away as I do about deaths right in front of me.
But then that would entail moral realism, and I suspect philosophers who make this argument are attempting to get the moral realist results out of a Naturalist outlook.
My first reaction to this is "Hey, he's right, next time I see a child drowning and I am wearing an expensive pair of shoes then I should just let the child drown, because I wouldn't sacrifice the shoes to save a child overseas so if I save this child I am being inconsistent and being inconsistent is wrong".
Yes, I know the philosophers in question have in mind that I fix the inconsistency problem by forgoing the shoes and sending the money overseas to save a child there.
But my way fixes the inconsistency problem just as well and also gets me the shoes.
And, yes, I am being facetious. The problem is not inconsistency. The problem is children (or anyone) dying when they could be saved.
But is it even inconsistent in the first place?
I would sacrifice the shoes to save the drowning child because a child dying right in front of me would make me feel absolutely terrible and I would feel terrible not saving him.
But, in common with pretty much every other human being, children dying far away has a lot less emotional impact on me. That is just they way we are built.
So I am being perfectly consistent if I would sacrifice the shoes to save the child in front of my eyes but not the child overseas, because the reason I make the sacrifice is the emotional impact and I am proportioning the sacrifice I would make to that emotional impact of the death on me.
In fact I would be inconsistent if I were to make a greater sacrifice proportional to the emotional impact for the child overseas.
And, again, if inconsistency is the problem we are trying to address (rather than children dying needlessly) then I should continue to consistently apportion my sacrifice to the emotional impact of the death on me.
I guess the philosophers in question might say that I ought to feel as strongly about deaths far away as I do about deaths right in front of me.
But then that would entail moral realism, and I suspect philosophers who make this argument are attempting to get the moral realist results out of a Naturalist outlook.
via International Skeptics Forum http://bit.ly/2DrOLtN
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