This was something brought up on another forum by some unreconstructed Marxist, that the WAllies had no practical reason not to land in France in 1943, bringing DDay back a year or so. The only reason for not doing so was something along the lines of wanting the Soviets to do all the heavy lifting and Churchill wanting to turn the Med into a British pond (or somesuch).
Anyway, that got me thinking what people here thought of it. What the pitfalls would have been.
For me, it was the flaws in the command and logistical structures highlighted by Torch and Sicily, and the need for more training. Also the lack of certain kit. I believe there would only have been parts for a single Mulberry, for example. Throw in no Transport Plan (in all likelihood), lack of air superiority, and the Battle of the Atlantic only turning the corner in April/May.
I read Grigg (1943: The Victory that Never Was) several years ago and remember being unimpressed by his arguments as a whole. It did highlight some interesting operational drift in 1943, but not something that could have been turned around (IMO) into a '43 invasion.
So...have at it!
...or not.
Anyway, that got me thinking what people here thought of it. What the pitfalls would have been.
For me, it was the flaws in the command and logistical structures highlighted by Torch and Sicily, and the need for more training. Also the lack of certain kit. I believe there would only have been parts for a single Mulberry, for example. Throw in no Transport Plan (in all likelihood), lack of air superiority, and the Battle of the Atlantic only turning the corner in April/May.
I read Grigg (1943: The Victory that Never Was) several years ago and remember being unimpressed by his arguments as a whole. It did highlight some interesting operational drift in 1943, but not something that could have been turned around (IMO) into a '43 invasion.
So...have at it!
...or not.
via JREF Forum http://ift.tt/1lCFM6p
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