Some threads in this forum relate materialism with science. The concepts of materialism and science are not homogeneous. Materialism is a philosophical theory. Therefore they cannot be matched. Even worse, “materialism” is a confusing word. At least, this is what Ulises Moulines (University of Munich) says. I will try to summarize his article “Por qué no soy materialista” (“Why I am not a materialist”). I will use his own words as long as I can.
1. Materialism is a confusing theory.
2. Vulgar materialists suppose that everybody know what matter is. But this is false. Nobody knows what the matter exactly is.
(PERSONAL NOTE: I will set aside Mouline’s exam of crude materialism and atomic materialism and I will centre myself in the more complex question: “scientificist materialism” (SM) affirms that matter is what the ultimate components are, according scientists).
3. Scientists have not a unified concept of “basic or ultimate components of matter”.
31. If they are honest they will recognize that there is not any unified theory of the matter and that the theories about “basic or ultimate components of matter” are changing with time.
311. Some examples: force fields, electromagnetic waves, probability waves, anti-particles, quantum vacuum, black holes, etc.
312. So, the concept of matter as “what the scientists say” (SM) is an empty concept.
313. Even such “immaterial” objects as telepathic transmission or astral influences have a similar conceptual structure to the “material” entities mentioned in 311.
3131. We can imagine that telepathy could be present in handbooks of physic or neurology in the future. It will be non sequitur if the materialists include this concept as a “form of matter”.
(PERSONAL NOTE: I respect Moulines’ incendiary example. Other cooler examples –but not less powerful- could be found in quantum mechanics, as the particle that is and not is in the same place at the same time).
4. Materialism has the same problem that all monist (“monolithic”) theory has.
41. If we affirm “All x is P”, and we don’t provide a precise set of restrictive characteristics that identifies P, we are not saying nothing because P can be understood however we want.
42. A predicate that fits everything is difficult to imagine.
43. Moulines thinks that pluralism -the reality is plural- is a more plausible situation.
Conclusion: A restricted materialism contradicts facts; a diffuse materialism says nothing.
(MOULINES' NOTE: Idealism is as contradictory as materialism for similar reasons).
1. Materialism is a confusing theory.
2. Vulgar materialists suppose that everybody know what matter is. But this is false. Nobody knows what the matter exactly is.
(PERSONAL NOTE: I will set aside Mouline’s exam of crude materialism and atomic materialism and I will centre myself in the more complex question: “scientificist materialism” (SM) affirms that matter is what the ultimate components are, according scientists).
3. Scientists have not a unified concept of “basic or ultimate components of matter”.
31. If they are honest they will recognize that there is not any unified theory of the matter and that the theories about “basic or ultimate components of matter” are changing with time.
311. Some examples: force fields, electromagnetic waves, probability waves, anti-particles, quantum vacuum, black holes, etc.
312. So, the concept of matter as “what the scientists say” (SM) is an empty concept.
313. Even such “immaterial” objects as telepathic transmission or astral influences have a similar conceptual structure to the “material” entities mentioned in 311.
3131. We can imagine that telepathy could be present in handbooks of physic or neurology in the future. It will be non sequitur if the materialists include this concept as a “form of matter”.
(PERSONAL NOTE: I respect Moulines’ incendiary example. Other cooler examples –but not less powerful- could be found in quantum mechanics, as the particle that is and not is in the same place at the same time).
4. Materialism has the same problem that all monist (“monolithic”) theory has.
41. If we affirm “All x is P”, and we don’t provide a precise set of restrictive characteristics that identifies P, we are not saying nothing because P can be understood however we want.
42. A predicate that fits everything is difficult to imagine.
43. Moulines thinks that pluralism -the reality is plural- is a more plausible situation.
Conclusion: A restricted materialism contradicts facts; a diffuse materialism says nothing.
(MOULINES' NOTE: Idealism is as contradictory as materialism for similar reasons).
via International Skeptics Forum http://ift.tt/1JeyEjR
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