We had a digression in the thread on Omni-whatsits into the nature of knowledge and belief, and it was suggested that we start a thread here.
We are analyzing statements of the form "S knows P" and "S believes P". Here, S is an agent -- the kind of thing that can reason and have beliefs. P is a proposition, so we are speaking of statements like "S knows George is dead," and not statements like "S knows George" or "S knows the Pledge of Allegiance."
Belief, in this context, means (roughly) taking P to be true. That is, "S believes P" means that S regards P as true. The SEP article on belief gives some alternative expansions for that. I haven't read it myself, but if anyone wants to read it and discuss it, we can.
Clearly, on this view of belief, believing that P is a necessary condition for knowing that P. Indeed, the following three conditions are widely regarded as necessary conditions for "S knows P"
(1) P is true.
(2) S believes P.
(3) S is justified in believing P.
Gettier presented a good argument (in my opinion, and I think that's consensus) that the above three conditions are not jointly sufficient. That is, (1), (2) and (3) may all be true, but "S knows P" is false.
That is about the extent of my understanding of the relation. This is not really my field, and I don't claim any expertise on these matters. But if others have objections or questions about the above, I will try to answer them -- at least so long as the exchange is fruitful, thought-provoking and does not devolve into yet another tired diatribe about how stoopid philosophy is.
So, questions, comments, objections?
We are analyzing statements of the form "S knows P" and "S believes P". Here, S is an agent -- the kind of thing that can reason and have beliefs. P is a proposition, so we are speaking of statements like "S knows George is dead," and not statements like "S knows George" or "S knows the Pledge of Allegiance."
Belief, in this context, means (roughly) taking P to be true. That is, "S believes P" means that S regards P as true. The SEP article on belief gives some alternative expansions for that. I haven't read it myself, but if anyone wants to read it and discuss it, we can.
Clearly, on this view of belief, believing that P is a necessary condition for knowing that P. Indeed, the following three conditions are widely regarded as necessary conditions for "S knows P"
(1) P is true.
(2) S believes P.
(3) S is justified in believing P.
Gettier presented a good argument (in my opinion, and I think that's consensus) that the above three conditions are not jointly sufficient. That is, (1), (2) and (3) may all be true, but "S knows P" is false.
That is about the extent of my understanding of the relation. This is not really my field, and I don't claim any expertise on these matters. But if others have objections or questions about the above, I will try to answer them -- at least so long as the exchange is fruitful, thought-provoking and does not devolve into yet another tired diatribe about how stoopid philosophy is.
So, questions, comments, objections?
via International Skeptics Forum http://ift.tt/1YsHmgs
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