mercredi 19 mars 2014

Personal Identity in a Multiverse

I exist as a unique individual at time X. At X+1, an atom of my body is replaced with an atom of the same type. At time X+2, another atom is replaced. Eventually, at time Y, my whole body has been replaced, yet the person at time X is the same person at time Y. It's still "me".



Identity over time is an old philosophical topic and I don't think anyone is going to dispute that it's "me" (in the common colloquial sense), at both time X and time Y, although the particles that make "me" up have totally changed during the interval between X and Y.



The problem is, if "me" can refer to two sets of different particles (if they're arranged the right way) across time, why can't "me" refer to two sets of particles (if they're arranged in the right way) across distance? If a multiverse is real, and contains enough universes, there will be many arrangements of particles that should count as "me". Why is personal identity preserved over time, when the particles (and even how they're arranged) change, but not over distance? Or is identity ultimately an incoherent concept?



I didn't know which forum to put this in, but considering the boost inflation theory just got, and the implications for a multiverse, I thought I'd put it here.





via JREF Forum http://ift.tt/1hDycs9

Aucun commentaire:

Enregistrer un commentaire